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Abstract. Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have been studied widely
in the computer security community for a long time. The recent develop-
ment of machine learning techniques has boosted the performance of the
intrusion detection systems significantly. However, most modern machine
learning and deep learning algorithms are exhaustive of labeled data that
requires a lot of time and effort to collect. Furthermore, it might be late
until all the data is collected to train the model.
In this study, we first perform a comprehensive survey of existing studies
on using machine learning for IDSs. Hence we present two approaches
to detect the network attacks. We present that by using a tree-based
ensemble learning with feature engineering we can outperform state-of-
the-art results in the field. We also present a new approach in selecting
training data for IDSs hence by using a small subset of training data
combined with some weak classification algorithms we can improve the
performance of the detector while maintaining the low running cost.
Keywords: Intrusion Detection System · Machine learning · Classifica-
tion.
1 Introduction
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is an important component in a computer
security system [33]. The task of a IDS is to detect malicious activities in the
computer system, hence enable quick reaction to the attacks. The task of IDSs
can be traced back to 1980 in the work of Anderson [4] where the author proposed
a “computer security threat monitoring and surveillance system” that can detect
the following behaviors: Use outside of normal time, Abnormal frequency of
use, Abnormal volume of data reference, and Abnormal patterns of reference to
programs or data.
Given the vital role of computer systems in our daily life today, the IDS
attracts more and more attention from both academia and industry in recent
years. According to IDC Cybersecurity Spending Guide 2019, worldwide spend-
ing on security might exceeds 100 billions of US Dollar in 2019 [13]. According
to Kaspersky Security Lab, while the number of denial services which keeps
growing since 2013 [43], the attackers now also focus on more advanced attacks
[25].
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On the other hand, more and more advanced attack techniques have been in-
vented over time, started with lone-wolf attacks in the early of 1990s to corporate-
and government-supported today. As the consequence, the traditional methods
based on signature and experts rule are no longer sufficient [34].
Over years, IDSs that based on machine learning techniques have been de-
veloped [33]. These techniques utilize the cutting-edge development in machine
learning research community in addition to the huge dataset gathered in cyber-
security research. We review state-of-the-art results in Section 2.
The main problem of the existing methods based on machine learning tech-
niques is that they are trained on one single huge dataset, hence prone to be
over-fitting when new types of attack are presented. These techniques usually
required a huge data that might not be always ready but might take time to
be collected. On the other hand, many widely used machine learning algorithms
in IDSs do not support online-learning, i.e. they need to be trained from begin-
ning if new data arrives. These techniques usually require a high computational
power. Moreover, even the researchers have designed comprehensive machine
learning systems for IDSs, th.e predictive performance is not yet to be perfect,
hence there exists a room for the improvement.
In this paper, we survey the existing machine learning techniques for IDSs
and perform a details benchmark on the real dataset collected by [41] in Section
2. Then we present our two approaches in using machine learning for IDSs: either
we use a complicated machine learning algorithm with a blind attack, or use a
light and fast algorithm with some training sampling techniques. We show that
the supervised-based approaches on IDSs are mostly solved by heavy machine
learning algorithms such as xgboost [12]. We propose a technique to sub-sampling
the training data set hence we can improve the predictive performance of weak
algorithms such as Naive Bayes classifier.
2 Literature Review
In general, there are two main approaches in using machine learning for IDSs:
supervised learning approaches in which a model tries to distinguish between
benign and malicious traffic flow, and unsupervised learning approaches, mostly
anomaly-detection based methods, in which a model tries to distinguish between
benign and other traffic flow. We do not discuss in this paper the traditional
signature-based intrusion detection approach [24] such as the well-known system
Snort [37].
2.1 Supervised Learning Approaches
Most of off-the-shelf supervised learning approaches have been used in IDS stud-
ies [22]. In short, the main task of a supervised classifier is to predict a network
flow is a benign or malicious attack, given a set of network flows with labels
(benign / attack) before for training.
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Traditional Machine Learning Approaches Traditional machine learning
approaches such as SVM, logistic regression or decision tree have been used for
a long time in IDSs.
The authors in [28, 26, 3, 42] proposed to use decision-tree for the classification
problem. A decision-tree is a classification algorithm that aiming to build a
sequential rules in term of if-else by minimizing the loss function in separating
the groups. The most common loss function using in building a decision tree is
Gini [3]. While the authors of [28, 26, 3] simply build a decision tree on a given
dataset, [42] combined the decision-tree technique with Genetic Algorithm [30]
for feature generation to achieve a better predictive performance.
Fig. 1. A decision tree built by Kruegel et al. [26]
Another popular traditional classification algorithm is used widely in IDS
is Support Vector Machine (SVM) [35, 5]. The core principle of SVM is to find
an optimized hyper-plane that can classify between two classes. In practice, the
most difficult task in building SVM models is to find a good kernel.
Combination of several techniques has been proposed in early of 2000s [42].
By the development of ensemble learning techniques, random forest has been
chosen as the most widely used technique [36]. The idea of random-forest is to
build multiple decision trees then combine the individual prediction of each tree.
Random forest has been proven to outperform other classification techniques in
well-defined dataset [16]. The random forest algorithm is visualized in Figure 2.
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Fig. 2. Random Forest
Deep Learning Based Approaches In recent years, deep learning research
achieves several important breakthrough results [16–18, 15]. It is no surprise that
researchers utilize the power of deep learning methods in IDS. However, mostly
feed-forward neural networks are being used in IDSs. A multi-layer feed-forward
neural network is visualized in Figure 3.
The authors in [19] proposed to use a multi-layer feed-forward neural net-
works instead of traditional methods such as logistic regression or SVM in IDSs.
The authors of [45] considered not only features generated by the system log but
also using word embedding techniques to learn from system calls.
Besides a simple multi-layer feed-forward neural networks, several research
studies have utilized more complicated networks such as ConvNet or Recurrent
Neural Networks [46]. The approach of [46] is presented in Figure 4. The main
problem of that approach and other similar approaches based on spatial and
temporal relations of network flows is that these information must be kept within
the system.
2.2 Anomaly-Detection Approaches
Different from supervised-based approaches, anomaly-detection approaches do
not assume a labeled dataset but try to learn what is benign flow and detect
any un-normal network flows [14]. Hence, the main assumption of an anomaly-
detection algorithm is that the benign flows is the majority class in the data.
Anomaly-detection algorithms can be divided into two sub-groups: statistical-
based algorithms and machine-learning based algorithms. Statistical algorithms
rely on statistical attributes of the data such as Z-score or Mahalanobis distance
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Fig. 3. The structure of a deep neural network.
Fig. 4. HAST-IDS system [46]
6 Q.V. Dang.
to detect anomaly. We summary several popular distance functions in Table 1
based on the survey of [9] and in Table 2 based on the study of [8].
Table 1. Similarity functions for numerical data [9]
Table 2. Similarity functions for categorical data [8]
On the other hand, machine-learning anomaly-detection algorithms rely on
machine learning techniques to learn the pattern of the normal data, then detect
if a new instance belongs to the class of normal data or not. Eskin et al. [20]
defined One-class SVM (OCSVM) based on the idea of SVM in classification,
but instead of separating two classes the OCSVM algorithm tries to separate
the data from its origin. Liu et al. [29] based on the idea of random forest to
build the isolation forest algorithm that determine the outlier score by the depth
of the tree that required to classify a single data point. The Isolation Forest is
visualized in Figure 5. We can see that it is difficult to classify a normal point
from the dataset because it is quite similar from other points, while it is relatively
easy to classify an anomaly point.
A good amount of research in outlier detection can be found in [1]. There
exists several survey of anomaly detection in particular for IDSs, such as [10] and
[6]. In general, anomaly-detection algorithms might have a better generalization
compared to supervised algorithms because they do not require labeled data
and can be adapted for the dynamic nature of the attacks. However, the main
concern of anomaly-detection algorithms is the high running time that make
them not applicable for real-time systems [44].
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Fig. 5. Isolation Forest tries to isolate an instance from others. Harder an instance to
be isolated, more normal it is.
3 Our Approaches
In this study we mainly rely on two learning approaches: Naive Bayes for a
lightweight solution and xgboost for heavy computational power resource.
3.1 Naive Bayes learning
Naive Bayes is probably one of the most simple learning algorithm we might
have today. Naive Bayes relies on Bayes’s theorem as
P (A|B) = P (B|A)P (A)
P (B)
(1)
Naive Bayes assume the independence between features, hence it can be
learnt very fast as:
P (f1, f2, ..fn|BENIGN) =
n∏
1
P (fi|BENIGN) (2)
then assign the prediction as the highest probability class.
3.2 xgboost
xgboost stands for eXtreme Gradient Boosting [12] is a recent ensemble technique
that has been introduced as one member of gradient boosting family [21]. The
main idea of gradient boosting techniques is to build multiple sequential learners
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(will be referred as weak learners) where the next learner tries to correct the error
made by the previous one.
Hence, the final boosting model of xgboost will be:
Fm(x) = F0(x) +
M∑
i=1
ρihi(x, ai) (3)
F0(x) is the initial model: F0(x) = argminρ
∑N
i=1 l(yi, ρ), i.e. F0(x) can be
initialized as constant. ρi is the weight value of the model number i, hi is the
base model (decision tree) at the ith iteration.
xgboost also introduced a new regularization term. The objective function is
usually defined as:
obj(θ) = l(θ) +Ω(θ) (4)
with l is the loss function (e.g. squared-error
∑
(yi − yˆi)2) and Ω is regular-
ization term.
In the original version of gbm, no regularization term is used in the objective
function. In contrast, xgb explicitly added regularization term, and an author of
xgb in fact called their model as “regularized gradient boosting”1.
On the other hand, gbm introduced shrinkage as regularization techniques
that are being used also by xgb. To use shrinkage, while updating the model in
each iteration:
Fm(X) = Fm−1(X) + ν.ρmh(x; am), 0 < ν ≤ 1 (5)
The idea is, instead of taking the full step toward the steepest-descent direc-
tion, we take only a part of the step determining by the value of ν.
xgboost is fully integrated to distributed data management systems such as
Apache Spark that allows us to perform xgboost in very huge dataset. To the
best of our knowledge there is not yet any attempt to use xgboost in IDSs.
4 Experimental Results
4.1 Datasets
Probably the KDD’99 dataset is the most popular dataset has been used for
evaluation of the IDSs2 [23, 2, 38]. However, the dataset has been criticized by
several research studies, such as the details analysis done by [32, 31]. Mainly, the
dataset is questioned for the generation process and the inconsistency in the data
description [40]. Furthermore, the dataset is created on a Solaris-based system
that has very little in common with popular operating systems today (Mac OS,
MS Windows, Ubuntu) [2].
1 https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-difference-between-the-R-gbm-gradient-
boosting-machine-and-xgboost-extreme-gradient-boosting/answer/Tianqi-Chen-1
2 http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html
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In this study, we decided to use the attacking datasets gathered by [41]
and made public by Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity3. We will refer to the
dataset as ISCXIDS2012 dataset as suggested by the creators. The dataset is
collected in total seven days in 2010 with different types of attacks.
We describe the details number of each type of network flows in following:
– Monday
• 529918 BENIGN flows.
– Tuesday
• 432074 BENIGN flows.
• 7938 FTP-Patator4.
• 5897 SSH-Patator.
– Wednesday
• 440031 BENIGN.
• 231073 DoS Hulk.
• 10293 DoS GoldenEye.
• 5796 DoS slowloris.
• 5499 DoS Slowhttptest.
• 11 Heartbleed.
– Thursday morning
• 168186 BENIGN.
• 1507 Web Attack Brute Force.
• 652 Web Attack XSS.
• 21 Web Attack SQL Injection.
– Thursday afternoon
• 288566 BENIGN.
• 36 Infiltration.
– Friday morning
• 189067 BENIGN.
• 1966 Bot.
– Friday afternoon 1
• 97718 BENIGN.
• 128027 DDos.
– Friday afternoon 2
• 127537 BENIGN.
• 158930 PortScan.
Each network flow is provided with a list of 78 features. A snapshot of the
dataset is presented in Figure 6. We might notice that the distribution of the
classes is extremely imbalanced: while the majority of the network flows are
BENIGN, the DDos flows occupied a huge share of the network but there is very
few Heartbleed flows for instance.
3 https://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/ids.html
4 https://tools.kali.org/password-attacks/patator
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Fig. 6. A snapshot of the dataset.
4.2 Metrics
As the dataset is extremely imbalanced, the common used metrics such as ac-
curacy do not necessarily reflect the true performance of an algorithm [11]. We
will use ROC AUC (Receiver Operating Characteristic - Area Under the Curve)
or AUC for short to evaluate our algorithm. The ROC is plotted against True
Positive Rate and False Positive Rate as visualized in Figure 7. The AUC will
be calculated as the area of the grey area and will take the value between 0 and
1, higher is better.
Fig. 7. ROC AUC measures the Area Under the Curve between the plot line created
by True Positive Rate and False Positive Rate of a model on a dataset.
AUC can penalize the majority prediction, i.e. to predict everything as the
major class. In this case the accuracy will be very high, but the AUC will be 0.
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We note that AUC is available for binary classification only.
4.3 Data Division
We divide the original dataset into three parts: training set, validation set and
test set by the ratio 60%, 20% and 20% respectively. We keep the validation set
and test set as fixed set and perform sampling on training set only in case.
4.4 Results
4.5 Full training data
Binary Classification In binary settings, we convert all attacks into one single
class ”ATTACK” in comparison to ”BENIGN”. The focus here is to detect net-
work attack without detecting the exact attack type. We display the predictive
performance of the model in Table 3. We notice the significant out-performance
of ensembles learning (random forest, xgboost) against other models.
Algorithm AUC
Naive Bayes 0.5
Logistic Regression 0.55
SVM (linear kernel) 0.62
OCSVM (RBF kernel) 0.57
Random Forest 0.92
xgboost 0.9992
Table 3. AUC of different classifier in binary setting.
We display the feature importance of the xgboost model in Figure 8. We
notice that the most importance feature in term of gain, i.e. “the relative con-
tribution of the corresponding feature to the model calculated by taking each
features contribution for each tree in the model” is Destination Port. It might be
surprised at the first sight, but in fact most of network attacking flow ( 68.6%)
has the destination port of 80 but the ratio in normal flow is only 10.4%.
Multi-class Classification In multi-class settings, we treat each attack type
as different. The confusion matrix of the xgboost model is displayed in Figure
9. The accuracy of the model is 99.8%.
4.6 Sub-training data
As the predictive performance of xgboost is almost perfect if we use the entire
training dataset, we suspect that we do not need all the training data for the
model. We analyze how much data we actually need for xgboost to perform well.
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Fig. 8. Feature Importance in binary classification settings
Fig. 9. Confusion matrix of multi-classifcation result
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We realize that the xgboost can perform very well in CICIDS’12 dataset
with a little training data. In fact, starting from 1% of training data the xgboost
model can achieve the AUC of 98.7% already.
Sample selection As the xgboost model can perform well with quite little of
training data, our next question is can we find a way to select this set of data for
other weaker algorithms, such as Naive Bayse. We recall that, by using the entire
training dataset the Naive Bayes achieved the AUC of approximate 0.5, i.e. the
Naive Bayes does not learn anything and in fact has the same performance with
random guessing.
The core reason for Naive Bayes to not perform well is that the distribution
of training data is far from the distribution of testing data, while the Naive
Bayes model lacks the flexibility to learn that [47]. Our plan is to find the most
close sub-set of training data compared to the testing set. However, the distance
metrics in high-dimension data might become unstable [7]. Due to that reason,
we first apply dimension reduction by Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
before calculating the distance.
By selecting top 10% of training data in term of the distance to the testing
set we can improve the AUC of Naive Bayes to 0.86 which is significant higher
than the naive usage on the entire dataset.
4.7 Discussion
CICIDS’2012 is a comprehensive dataset to evaluate the performance of IDSs in
an effort to replace the outdated KDD’99 dataset. CICIDS’12 has attracted a
lot of attention from the research community. The predictive performance has
been increased over years. In this study we showed that the problem defined in
CICIDS’2012 is almost solved by using gradient boosting technique, implies that
we need a new and more complicated dataset as the ground for evaluation of
IDSs.
On the other hand, there is not much effort in studying and using simple
techniques like Naive Bayes recently due to the attention in deep learning tech-
niques. Nevertheless we show that Naive Bayes still can achieve quite a high
predictive performance given a proper training dataset, meaning that there is
still a room for improvement of these algorithms.
5 Conclusions & Future Works
In this study, we showed that the the problem of intrusion detection with CI-
CIDS’2012 can be solved mostly perfect with recent ensemble machine learning
technique like xgboost, even with a small training dataset. We also show that
by using sample selection method based on PCA algorithm we can improve the
predictive performance of a simple learning algorithm like Naive Bayes.
In the future research we will study different methods for sample selections,
particularly using uncertainty estimation techniques [27, 39].
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